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 The Hybridization of National Collective Bargaining Systems: The Impact of the 
Economic Crisis on the Transformation of Collective Bargaining in the European 
Union 
Abstract 
In this article it is argued that the economic crisis has made national collective bargaining 
systems increasingly multi-layered, perforated, and dynamically unstable, i.e. hybrid. We 
explain these transformations in terms of the concomitance of two different sources of 
change which do not necessarily follow the same logics. The first source stems from 
national systems’ endogenous logic of path dependency and the second from pressure to 
reform in accordance with exogenously given strategies and logics. It is argued that these 
sources act like a whipsaw, pushing and pulling national collective bargaining systems 
between the two logics, leading to hybrid collective bargaining systems.  
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 Introduction 
 
Since the advent of the global economic crisis in Europe in 2008, employment relations 
per se and the processes and institutional structures of collective bargaining, i.e. collective 
bargaining systems, in particular have become increasingly contested (e.g. Blanchard et 
al., 2014; Marginson, 2015a;  Meardi, 2014; Visser, 2016). In fact, collective bargaining 
became one of the most important arenas for policy makers in Europe since the labour 
market had to bear the costs of economic recovery and therefore collective bargaining 
systems were often seen as the key facilitator or obstacle for labour market adjustment 
(European Commission, 2015a; IMF, 2015a; Marginson, 2015a). Even though policies 
regarding labour market adjustment included a variety of dimensions and aspects such as 
vocational training (e.g. Heyes, 2013), employment regulation and protection (e.g. Heyes 
and Lewis, 2014), pensions, flexible employment arrangements, privatization of 
companies (e.g. Larsen and Navrbjerg, 2013; Roche et al., 2015;  Svalund, 2015), the 
underlying principle was that labour (cost-) productivity should be increased in order to 
reduce unemployment. This would be achieved primarily by moderating wages but also 
by making the labour market more flexible, i.e. by weakening working conditions and 
employment regulations, if needed. Against this background, national collective 
bargaining systems became contested on their ability to enforce this rationale and strategy 
(Eurofound, 2014a). 
 Since economic recovery in the European Union (EU) was lagging behind 
expectations and in some countries the labour market did not recover at all after the 2008 
“shock”, international and national policy makers motivated national social partners, i.e. 
employers’ organisations and trade unions, to revamp traditional national collective 
bargaining institutions and processes (e.g. Angrave et al., 2017) and/or enforced reforms 
of national collective bargaining systems. Such exogenous enforced reforms were most 
pervasive and severe in countries which made bilateral agreements (i.e. memoranda of 
understandings) with creditor institutions such as the European Commission (EC), the 
European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), i.e. the so 
called Troika. However, exogenous pressure upon national social partners to reform 
collective bargaining systems also increased in all EU member states because of the 
Europe 2020 strategy and EU’s new economic governance system which also perceived 
collective bargaining systems as key for labour market adjustments (Schulten and Müller, 
2013, 2014).  
In fact, this pressure has led to a continuum of larger and smaller reforms of one 
or more dimensions of national collective bargaining systems in many member states of 
the EU (e.g. Eurofound, 2014b; Eurofound, 2016; European Commission, 2015b; 
Marginson, 2015a, 2017). Against this background, in this article we argue that these 
exogenously driven reforms of national collective bargaining systems have rarely fully 
replaced old institutional structures or completely superseded old social partners’ 
 activities. Instead we will explain that these changes led to the increased formation of 
collective bargaining units at different layers, or subsystems of collective bargaining with 
different actors at different layers. For example, in countries in which bargaining 
traditionally took place at higher level, the reforms had the effect that company level 
bargaining often took place in addition to, but not in expense of, the traditional bargaining 
level. This means that national collective bargaining systems became increasingly multi-
layered with different bargaining units and actors, i.e. subsystems, at different levels. We 
will further argue that we find it reasonable to assume that different subsystems with 
different actors, i.e. social partners, which are involved in collective bargaining, do not 
necessarily follow the same logic and direction of change and adoption because they 
might be embedded in a different economic context (e.g. different sectors) and have 
different interests and preferences. We also argue that many reforms increased the 
opportunities for lower level bargaining units, i.e. companies, to opt out (or in) of 
collective agreements. Thus these reforms increasingly created “loopholes” in traditional 
national collective bargaining systems which are characterized by a predominant, 
homogeneous and uniform, institutional structure of collective bargaining. These 
loopholes are causing traditional national collective bargaining systems to become 
increasingly heterogeneous and “perforated”. Furthermore we will argue that due to the 
fact that opt out clauses are often of a temporary nature, e.g. enable companies to opt out 
of a higher level agreement for a limited period of time, and because of the incremental 
 and constant introduction of various other reforms to collective bargaining institutions, 
national collective bargaining systems also became increasingly dynamically unstable.  
Thus, this article aims to explain how and why national collective bargaining 
systems increasingly transformed into multi-layered, perforated, and dynamically 
unstable, i.e. hybrid, systems of collective bargaining. The article is organized as follows. 
Against the background that collective bargaining systems have always changed, the next 
section discusses the logics and dynamics behind endogenous transformations of 
bargaining systems. This is followed by a discussion of the exogenous pressure of reform 
which came with the advent of the global economic crisis. We then give an overview of 
the manifold and diverse reforms and changes which were observable in different 
collective bargaining dimensions throughout the EU member states in recent times. We 
then develop our theoretical hypothesis on the hybridization of national collective 
bargaining systems and confront them with empirical information provided by the rich 
Eurofound archive. The article finishes by summarizing the key arguments and results 
and addresses the implications for current and future attempts to reform collective 
bargaining systems in Europe. 
 
Path dependency in the transformation of national collective bargaining systems 
 
 Since the industrial revolution gave birth to collective bargaining when the first trade 
unions were formed, its processes and institutional structures have transformed 
substantially. In fact collective bargaining systems have always adapted and transformed 
along with the changing economic and market context (Brandl and Traxler, 2011; Crouch, 
1993; Hyman, 2001; Marginson, 2015b) meaning that the national embeddedness of 
collective bargaining in specific national, economic and political systems and regimes 
became increasingly influential for shaping distinct national collective bargaining 
systems. As countries developed differing economic and political systems throughout the 
20th century, so too did national collective bargaining systems change. In fact, collective 
bargaining systems proved to be quite adaptable and flexible and have transformed 
continuously and sometimes even dramatically since their birth in the wake of 
industrialization (Bechter and Brandl, 2015). 
However, there are, of course, differences in the quality and in the quantity of 
transformations in the long history of collective bargaining across countries. As regards 
the quality of transformation, the vast majority of transformations of national collective 
bargaining systems are characterized by relatively minor changes in one or the other 
dimension of the institutional and organisational structure of collective bargaining. For 
example, if bargaining domains are split or merged or if the regulations for the extension 
of collective agreements (erga omne clauses) or opening clauses are slightly changed. 
Collective bargaining systems always and continuously underwent such transformations 
 which shows that these systems do usually have the ability to gradually adapt to various 
contemporary challenges and demands. These gradual changes are well documented 
particularly for the EU member states (e.g. European Commission, 2013, 2015a; Ferner 
and Hyman, 1992). 
However, the history of collective bargaining also shows that at certain points in 
time, collective bargaining systems have undergone quite radical, incisive and 
fundamental transformations which then change abruptly the basic characteristics and 
nature of collective bargaining systems. Examples of rather severe and abrupt (i.e. non-
gradual) changes are the transformations of employment relations in the early 1980s, for 
example, the dismantling of sectoral collective bargaining in the UK (e.g. Edwards et al., 
1998) but also when sectoral collective bargaining became reorganized, i.e. coordinated 
in Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden, (e.g. Ahlén, 1989; Traxler et al., 2008; Visser 
and Hemerijck, 1997). However, there are also differences across countries in terms of 
how conflictual or smooth the transformations are. While endogenously induced 
transformations tend to be relatively smooth, exogenously imposed transformations often 
led to conflicts and unrest, as for example since the begin of the of the economic crisis in 
Greece and Portugal (Brandl and Ibsen, 2017).  
In fact, there appears to be a general picture, that  those transformations of 
collective bargaining which were exogenously imposed upon social partners, i.e. by 
actors who are not directly involved in collective bargaining for the relevant bargaining 
 unit (e.g. the government as a regulator or by any international organisation such as the 
Troika organizations), often led to conflict and frictions and encountered resistance from 
the actors involved (e.g. Sanz et al., 2016), while those  transformations  initiated by social 
partners themselves, enjoyed usually smooth  transitions. In other words in the sense of 
North (1991) there appears to be a tendency that frictions will arise if the rules of the 
game, i.e. of collective bargaining for the relevant bargaining unit, are defined and 
changed exogenously by actors who are not taking part in collective bargaining.   
However, if the rules of the games are transformed endogenously from within, i.e. from 
actors who are directly involved in collective bargaining, frictions are diminished.   
Yet independent of whether the transformation of the national collective 
bargaining system was conflictual or smooth, the trigger of the transformation was often 
an exogenous economic shock or a crisis. In fact many major transformations of collective 
bargaining systems occurred in (or after) times of crisis and economic turmoil. For 
example, before the current economic crisis, the inflationary (oil) shocks of the 1970s 
triggered a number of severe transformations of national collective bargaining systems 
although with differences in pace and shape across countries (Brandl and Traxler, 2011). 
Even though many past transformations were induced by exogenous shocks or crises, the 
sources of transformation of the bargaining systems came from within the national system 
of collective bargaining and followed the national logic of change. As we argue in this 
article, this process has changed dramatically since the global economic crisis arrived in 
 Europe in 2008 as exogenous sources of change to national systems of collective 
bargaining came into play. 
 
Exogenous sources and pressure of reform  
 
The past decades have seen a number of cross-national trends in the transformation of 
national collective bargaining systems in Europe. While there was a trend towards 
increasing centralisation of national systems of collective bargaining in the 1960s and 
1970s, this trend reversed from the 1980s onwards (e.g. Brandl and Traxler, 2011; 
Crouch, 1993; Flanagan, 1999). Even though the reasons for these changing trends in the 
transformation of national collective bargaining systems are in debate and range from the 
rise and fall, i.e. increase and decrease, of “financialization”, of “monetarism” or simply 
of neoliberal ideas and paradigms and shifting power relations (e.g. Baccaro and Howell, 
2011; Brandl and Traxler, 2011; Crouch, 2011; Marginson, 2016; Streeck, 2009; Thelen, 
2014) there is no doubt that these transformations followed a cross-national Zeitgeist 
which is more or less independent of country specific traditions (Brandl and Ibsen, 2017).  
As outlined earlier, since the 1980s, there is a trend towards decentralisation in 
the transformation of national collective bargaining systems. However, in the majority of 
the EU member states, this Zeitgeist did not erode the core features of existing national 
collective bargaining systems. In fact, the key characteristics and dimensions of national 
 collective bargaining systems remained relatively stable in most countries until 2008 
(Van Guys and Schulten, 2015).  
However, this changed after the advent of the economic crisis in 2008 as the 
process of decentralisation of collective bargaining gained increased momentum and 
power with pushes and help from outside. External pressure was particularly visible from 
international organisations, which not only pushed governments to reform systems 
fundamentally, but also motivated direct governmental intervention into free collective 
bargaining between social partners (Molina, 2014).  
This process of exogenously driven reform of collective bargaining systems was 
most pervasive in the Troika countries such as Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and 
Spain, i.e. in countries which received financial support from the Troika organisations. 
One requirement for financial support from the Troika was that countries must implement 
structural reforms, especially of the labour market and its institutions which included a 
transformation of national collective bargaining systems (Marginson, 2015a). For all 
countries, the Troika often used a blueprint of institutional reform, i.e. a “one size fits all” 
approach of institutional change, which followed the logic of decentralization of national 
collective bargaining systems (Van Guys and Schulten, 2015).   
However, the Troika was not the only exogenous source which induced changes 
to national collective bargaining systems. The EU also put increasing pressure upon 
national collective bargaining systems since the EU introduced a comprehensive package 
 of measures to foster European economic governance and strengthen the coordination of 
economic, budgetary and employment policies across all EU member states (European 
Commission, 2013). The pressure of  potentially having to reform national collective 
bargaining systems for all EU member states further increased in 2011 when the EU 
introduced the European semester as one pillar of the EU’s new economic governance 
regime.  
The idea behind the new economic governance regime is that any macro-
economic imbalances within and between countries are identified and addressed in a 
timely manner by providing country specific recommendations (CSRs). Various EU 
Member States received CSRs to change their employment relations systems including 
reforms of collective bargaining processes and institutions. However, as with many other 
international organisations, the EU is only giving recommendations (Marginson, 2016) 
and thus it seems that the auxiliary actors of change are, in fact, national governments and 
occasionally even national social partners. Yet as non-compliance with the 
recommendations of the European Semester ultimately implies financial sanctions for 
national countries, and as the labour market and in particular wage developments and 
collective bargaining systems are seen as central policy areas (European Council, 2011), 
the pressure to reform collective bargaining systems is directly imposed on national actors 
from the EU (Schulten and Müller, 2014; Seikel, 2016; Van Guys and Schulten, 2015).   
 The rationale behind many CSRs is very similar to that of the Troika and followed 
the path of decentralization (European Commission, 2015b). The CSRs included for 
example the introduction of or wider scope for opportunities to derogate from sectoral or 
national collective agreements for companies, the limitation or even the abolition of the 
favourability principle, which guarantees that employees cannot be made worse off by 
another collective agreement, and the limitation and reduction in the scope for the 
extension of collective agreements to non-signatory companies. In any case, the new EU 
economic governance framework has already led to various significant changes in 
collective bargaining systems at the national level (Erne, 2015; Schulten and Müller, 
2014; Van Gyes and Schulten, 2015). 
Thus both the EU’s new economic governance system and the memoranda of 
understandings of some countries with the Troika, has led to a number of transformations 
in one or the other dimension of national collective bargaining systems since 2008. 
Recently, these partially exogenously driven transformations have been questioned with 
respect to their effectiveness and “success” (Blanchard et al., 2014; IMF, 2015). In fact it 
has become increasingly clear after many years of reform that various attempts and efforts 
did not fully materialize in making national collective bargaining systems (completely) 
decentralised. Instead multi-layered, perforated, and dynamically unstable, i.e. hybrid, 
systems of collective bargaining became increasingly typical. In this paper we aim to 
 explain this puzzle of how and why this exogenously induced reform process led to the 
hybridisation of national systems of collective bargaining.  
 
The economic crisis and changing collective bargaining systems in Europe 
 
The arrival of the economic crisis in 2008 caused a sharp decline in economic growth 
throughout the EU leading unemployment levels to hit unprecedented heights. With this 
economic situation in the background, the structure of the European labour market 
changed considerably. Skyrocketing youth unemployment rates in various countries (e.g. 
in Italy and Spain),  shifts in the job structure among different occupational groups and 
sectors as well as an increase in precarious, a-typical employment relationships and an 
increase of temporary employment (European Commission, 2015b; Eurostat, 2013; 
ETUI, 2014; Doerflinger and Pulignano, 2015; Molina, 2014) created a new  economic 
and social environment. All this has changed the context of employment relations and put 
pressure on collective bargaining systems to “deliver” on what national and international 
policy makers asked.  
This impact on member states’ economies has been uneven however so that the 
collective bargaining systems of different EU member states have faced varying levels of 
economic and social challenges (European Commission, 2015b). With these changes in 
the economic and social background, various transformations of national collective 
 bargaining systems were observable. These transformations include different subsystems, 
e.g. collective bargaining units at different layers (tiers or levels), and different 
characteristics and aspects of national collective bargaining systems (Marginson, 2015a).  
In particular, there are four key dimensions of collective bargaining which have 
changed since 2008 and  made national collective bargaining systems increasingly multi-
layered and perforated. Table 1 gives an overview of these dimensions and shows the 
countries which were largely affected in one or the other dimensions. 
 
- Table 1 about here - 
 
The first key dimension is the introduction/increase of opening clauses. In many 
countries reforms were initiated since the advent of the economic crisis which made it 
increasingly easy for companies to opt out or to deviate from encompassing collective 
agreements (Schulten and Müller, 2013). Thus loopholes were increasingly introduced 
into encompassing higher level bargaining systems which not only made national systems 
increasingly perforated, i.e. permeable, but also increased the number and role of different 
layers of bargaining. A second dimension relates to changes in extension mechanisms. 
This means, in countries in which company level bargaining takes place but agreements 
are extended to the whole sector, the extension of agreements was made increasingly 
difficult since 2008 (Visser, 2016). Third, in some countries the perforation was increased 
 by enabling the involvement of non-union representatives in collective bargaining 
(Koukiadis, 2009). Granting negotiations rights to non-union bodies not only increased 
the number of actors, but also led to an increase in the number of lower level collective 
bargaining units and derogation from originally encompassing agreements (Visser, 2016). 
Fourth, as regards changes in the quality of collective bargaining, the most far-reaching 
impact on the practice of opt out from higher level collective agreements was the 
renunciation of the paradigm in some countries that lower-level agreements are not 
allowed to deviate unfavourably from the wage and working conditions agreed at a higher 
level (Clauwaert and Schömann, 2012; Marginson, 2015a).  
With regard to the effect of these changes on the incidence of collective 
bargaining, all these changes taken together did not suspend collective bargaining in all 
the affected countries per se nor did one structure (e.g. layer of bargaining) disappear 
completely.  As can be seen in Table 1, these changes in the four dimensions led to a 
transformation in the structure of national collective bargaining systems, with the effect 
that the number of higher level collective agreements decreased, but to compensate,  the 
number of lower level agreements increased which made  national systems increasingly 
“fractured” (Marginson, 2017). Furthermore, the temporary nature of reform practices 
made national systems dynamically unstable in the sense that the predominant level at 
which bargaining takes place might fluctuate over time (Eurofound, 2014b).  
 In some countries these transformations were observable before the advent of the 
economic crisis in 2008 and followed mainly the trail of gradual adaption to changing 
market conditions and were predominantly endogenously induced by national social 
partners themselves (e.g. Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands). Since the advent of the 
economic crisis in 2008, the pace of change has increased significantly and was largely 
induced exogenously and thus might have led to deviations from the traditional path of 
transformation in either one or the other dimension or subsystem (Schulten and Müller, 
2014; Seikel, 2016; Van Guys and Schulten, 2015). Thus there are two sources of change 
to national collective bargaining systems which are simultaneously pulling and pushing 
in various dimensions and subsystems of national collective bargaining systems.  
 
When endogenous and exogenous forces collide: the formation of hybrid systems 
 
There is a long history of research on the transformation of institutions which can be 
categorized into various streams of approaches: the historical, sociological, rational 
choice (Hall and Taylor, 1996), and the constructivist approach (Morgan and Hauptmeier, 
2014). In all of these approaches, path dependence has a prominent role although seen 
from different angles and with different emphasis on the impact of path dependency on 
actual transformation, i.e. whether path dependency is only a weak (e.g. Djelic and Quack 
2005) or strong (e.g. David, 1994; Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000) driving force. 
 Nevertheless, the importance of path dependency is a common denominator of all 
theoretical approaches, acknowledging that “history matters”, that there is a “shadow of 
the past” for any institutional transformation (Ebbinghaus, 2005) and that path 
dependency is guiding and/or hindering transformation (North, 1991). 
As regards the transformation of institutional systems with different dimensions 
and subsystems, such as national collective bargaining systems have, the role of path 
dependency is argued to be even more important. This significance is due to institutional 
complementarity, which refers to interdependences among sub-systems (e.g. Pagano, 
2011). In fact, different institutional features of national systems and subsystems are 
stabilizing and reinforcing each other which makes change in one dimension or subsystem 
difficult or even impossible. According to this theoretical reasoning, systems’ 
transformations are either blocked by different subsystems or forced to follow its 
traditional, i.e. endogenous, path.  
Breaking the endogenous path of transformation is therefore sometimes only 
possible through exogenous pressure. As argued for example by Kang (2006), in such 
situations path breaking transformations can sometimes only happen through exogenous 
shocks, i.e. by events which radically change the context in which systems are embedded. 
Even though not all transformations are necessarily driven by exogenous sources and 
shocks but can also be based on endogenous and gradual changes (e.g. Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005), it is evident that past shocks, crises and events did often lead to 
 fundamental transformations of institutional systems (e.g. Crouch, 1993, 2005; Deeg, 
2001; Thelen, 2003; Brandl and Traxler, 2011).  The current economic crisis is certainly 
a perfect case in point for fundamental transformation.  
Ebbinghaus (2005) differentiates in his theoretical account of transformation 
between unplanned “trodden paths” and “branching pathways”. Particularly for the 
branching pathway account, he stresses the role and will of actors within systems to 
overcome the old path and choose new pathways. Which path actors choose depends very 
much upon their interests and preferences. For example social partners at a company level 
might have different interests to social partners at the sectoral level. The interests of actors 
might also differ in different companies and sectors. In any case, different interests among 
actors in different subsystems imply that different pathways of transformation might be 
followed.  
The more subsystems a national collective bargaining system includes, and the 
more drastic the transformation is, the greater the uncertainty of both the individual and 
aggregate outcome of actors’ actions and what the overall outcome of transformation of 
the whole system will be. Thus the transformation of the system itself is uncertain as 
individual actors can be assumed to act according to a bounded rationality (Pierson, 
2000). Bounded rationality of actors in following different pathways of transformation 
becomes increasingly important in relation to institutional complementarity where 
complementarities develop and change over time as subsystems change their manner of 
 functioning as a result of adapting to contingent events and the impacts of other 
subsystems (Morgan, 2005; Kang, 2006). Thus, in order to explain the aggregate 
transformation of national collective bargaining systems with different subsystems, one 
has to take into account that different subsystems might follow different pathways of 
transformation with different logics of change, or dynamism in the sense of Marginson 
(2017). 
In the following we argue that the current global economic crisis was a major 
exogenous shock which has partially broken “trodden” traditional pathways and opened 
“branching pathways” to social partners. However, these pathways were not always 
opened by innovative actors by themselves but sometimes ripped open by exogenous 
parties, e.g. by the reforms initiated by the Troika which opened social partners in some 
subsystems to new pathways. We further argue that different subsystems, e.g. collective 
bargaining units in different sectors and/or on different layers, within national collective 
bargaining systems do not necessarily have the same interests and are differently bound 
by different constraints (Traxler and Brandl, 2009). While some subsystems and their 
transformation are constrained by a gradual and endogenously driven path dependency 
others follow new exogenously induced pathways of transformation. Thus, from an 
aggregate level, i.e. from the perspective of the national collective bargaining system 
itself, there are two different sources of transformation which do not necessarily follow 
the same logics. Against the background that different subsystems might follow different 
 pathways with different logics of transformation, we hypothesize that the logics 
potentially diverge between subsystems which makes the aggregate, i.e. the national 
system of collective bargaining, increasingly multi-layered, perforated, and dynamically 
unstable, i.e. increasingly hybrid.  
In employment relations literature, the term “hybrid collective bargaining 
systems” is sometimes used to describe multi-layered bargaining systems (e.g. 
Braakmann and Brandl, 2016; Kalmi et al., 2012) but as yet an exact definition of 
hybridization does not exist. This differs to other disciplines (Piotti, 2011), in particular  
in organisational studies where the concept of hybridization is frequently applied to 
explain change and inertia of national institutional systems with respect to the increasing 
internationalization of economies and societies (Boyer, 2005). In the wider context of 
employment relations, there is some literature which argues by using the hybridization 
concept that the transfer of institutions and institutional reform is impeded by the need to 
adjust the system according to the needs of the specific country context as well as to past 
processes and practices (e.g. Boyer, 1998; Dörrenbächer et al., 2000; Piotti, 2011; 
Tolliday et al., 1998). According to this literature, a complete and comprehensive transfer 
of a countries’ national system onto another country can rarely be found, but institutional 
reform and transfer leads to a hybrid system in their definition, which integrates 
characteristics of the new and old system. According to this hybridization concept, any 
 institutional reform of a national collective bargaining system according to a blueprint 
will not fully materialize.  
This concept of hybridization can explain why some institutional systems are not 
fully replaced by new systems but the old institutions are often rather adapted to serve 
new goals in order to meet new demands (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Thus this definition 
suggests that the transfer of systems is dependent upon whether or not functional 
equivalents of specific system components and characteristics exist or not (Tolliday et al., 
1998). If there is a functional equivalent of the old system which serves the same goal it 
is likely to remain and if not, it is likely to be replaced. Thus, this concept of hybridization 
explains how and why institutional reform leads to fused or crossed systems which are 
characterized by a complex combination of potentially overlapping subsystems and 
functional parallelism of subsystems.  
In this paper we will adapt this conceptualization of hybridization to describe the 
transformation of national collective bargaining systems since the advent of the economic 
crisis in the EU. As regards the form and structure we define a hybrid system on the basis 
of three dimensions. First, a hybrid national collective bargaining system is characterized 
by the presence of  multiple  layers at which collective bargaining takes place and with 
different actors involved, i.e. by the concomitance of multiple bargaining units and 
potential functional parallelism. The latter describes how some bargaining subsystems 
can co-exist and pursue the same actions (i.e. are repetitive) or different and potentially 
 competing actions. Second, collective bargaining at each layer is permeable in the sense 
that deviations and exceptions exist. Thus, there is no uniform layer at which collective 
bargaining takes place which is exclusive to a national collective bargaining system but 
each layer is characterized by “loopholes” which makes the system perforated. Third, a 
hybrid collective bargaining system is characterized by a dynamic instability in the sense 
that relevant layers for individual employees and companies change over time. This 
means for example that over a period of some years employees in companies could be 
covered by a sectoral collective agreement, then by a company agreement and later by no 
agreement or again a sectoral agreement. This instability is due to the fact that companies 
are able to make use of opening clauses which are often only temporary (e.g. for two 
years). In addition to the fact that the institutional structure and legal framework of 
collective bargaining is reformed different higher level agreements are in place or not. 
Thus, hybrid collective bargaining systems are no longer  dynamically stable  in the sense 
that there is certainty for employees that in the upcoming years they are covered by a 
specific (company or higher level) collective agreement (or not).  
Thus we augment previous conceptualizations of hybrid collective bargaining 
systems which focused mainly on the existence of multiple layers (e.g. Braakmann and 
Brandl, 2016; Kalmi et al., 2012) by introducing the characteristics of dynamic instability 
and perforation. In particular we argue that national collective bargaining systems are 
becoming increasingly hybrid in the sense that they are becoming increasingly multi-
 layered, perforated and dynamically unstable. We do not claim that current national 
collective bargaining systems in Europe have already become (completely) hybrid. We 
rather prefer to explain a tendency towards this concept of hybridization of national 
collective bargaining systems. Also, we certainly do not claim that national collective 
bargaining systems were ever completely homogeneous and uniform, i.e. showed no sign 
of perforation, before the crisis and that there was no sign towards an increase in the 
multi-layered structure of national collective bargaining systems. Furthermore we do not 
claim that collective bargaining systems were highly stable before the crisis. In fact, in 
many countries, collective bargaining always took place at different layers, deviations 
were possible and the structure of bargaining changed over time. However, we argue that 
since the advent of the economic crisis the hybridization of national collective bargaining 
systems in Europe has gained significant momentum.  
 
National systems whipsawed between two forces and the evolution of hybrid systems 
 
The résumé of the theoretical considerations is that attempts to reform national collective 
bargaining systems are likely to not fully materialize, but lead to the hybridization of 
national collective bargaining systems. As the exogenously induced transformations to 
national collective bargaining systems relate to different subsystems and dimensions of 
national systems and the pressure to reform is asymmetrically distributed across national 
 systems, it is likely that different subsystems follow different pathways of transformation. 
These different pathways could be characterized by the different (wage) strategies actors 
are following and might materialize in differing success which in turn might affect other 
features such as the organizational density of actors. However, the résumé of the above 
described empirical transformations of national collective bargaining systems since the 
advent of the economic crisis clearly shows that pathways are opened to lower layer units 
of bargaining and those pathways of higher layer units are partially closed or undermined. 
However, the same pathways were not induced in the same way in all member states of 
the EU. In fact the magnitude of exogenous and endogenous forces which drove 
transformations of national systems, were not symmetrically strenuous across all EU 
member states.  
While the exogenous driving forces of transformation were especially strong in 
the Troika countries, national collective bargaining systems proved to be relatively 
resilient to any exogenous pressures of transformation in countries such as Austria, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, (Eurofound, 2016, Sanz et al., 2016; Voss et al., 
2016). This, however, does not mean collective bargaining systems in these countries 
underwent no transformation. On the contrary, in the latter countries also, opening clauses 
were increasingly introduced and company level bargaining fostered but these changes 
were mainly induced endogenously, i.e. these transformations followed the pathway and 
logic of endogenous transformation. The transformation of the German system of 
 collective bargaining in the past two decades is a good example of how (gradual) 
endogenous change transformed a national collective bargaining system substantially 
(Baccaro and Howell, 2011). However, this endogenous logic of transformation was 
potentially also induced (or at least inspired) by the Zeitgeist of institutional 
transformations which followed the logic of decentralization.  
Overall, as regards the role of endogenous and exogenous forces of 
transformation, we observe that in some countries and in some periods of time one force 
dominates over the other but usually both forces are at work.  Even in the Troika countries 
the exogenously induced reforms never fully replaced all dimensions and subsystems of 
the traditional national systems which existed before. Thus endogenous forces were never 
completely superseded. In fact, also in the Troika countries, endogenous forces 
sometimes exerted a resistance which slowed down and sometimes even resisted 
exogenously induced pressure due to the heavy protests of the actors involved (e.g. Sanz 
et al., 2016). Even the Greek government, which certainly faced one of the biggest 
exogenous induced pressures to reform, was sometimes able to defer or soften some 
proposed reforms (e.g. Kyriakopoulos, 2014), not least because of some degrees of 
“vagueness” and uncertainty in the externally imposed recommendations of reform. 
Thus, in all EU member states, national collective bargaining systems 
transformed, but at varying speeds and on different pathways which were variously 
opened by both endogenous and exogenous forces of transformation in diverse ways. This 
 process across countries has led to the evolution of differently accentuated hybrid national 
systems of collective bargaining across many EU member states. 
 
The increased hybridization of national collective bargaining systems  
 
One major stylized fact emerges when looking at the structure of national systems of 
collective bargaining in the years after the advent of the economic crisis: the outcomes of 
the reforms, the efforts made to further decentralize collective bargaining, often led to an 
increased number of collective agreements which were struck on top, i.e. in addition, or 
at the expense of (existing) sector agreements (see also Table 1). The explanation for this 
is, as outlined before, that throughout the EU it became, not only possible via opening 
clauses, but also often a common practice, that wages and working conditions were 
regulated increasingly on the basis of agreements with a relatively narrow domain , i.e. at 
the company level. On the one hand this made national collective bargaining systems 
increasingly perforated in the sense that any encompassing higher level collective 
agreements were undermined and washed out by an increasing number of lower level 
agreements or exceptions. On the other hand, this development made national systems 
increasingly complex as multiple layers, or multiple levels or ties, emerged at which 
collective bargaining can take place in parallel. Table 2 gives an overview of the incidence 
and change during the economic crisis, i.e. from 2009 to 2013, of collective agreements 
 in companies which fall under any form of collective bargaining at different layers/levels 
in all EU member states. 
 
- Table 2 about here - 
  
As can be seen in Table 2 there is a large variation among companies which fall 
under any form of collective agreement in terms of the level/layer at which the collective 
agreement has been struck in different countries.  This variation existed in the early years 
of the crisis, i.e. in 2009, and in later years, i.e. in 2013. In fact there is not one single 
country in the EU in which the reforms in one or the other dimension of collective 
bargaining led to a complete transformation towards fully decentralized collective 
bargaining. Company bargaining did not replace higher level (nor company) bargaining 
completely, as can be seen in Table 2, not even in the Troika countries which witnessed 
the strongest pressure of transformation among all EU member states. In all countries the 
reforms and institutional changes in different dimensions of collective bargaining led to 
the increased formation of collective bargaining systems which are characterized by the 
concomitance of parallel layers at which bargaining can take place simultaneously, i.e. of 
multi-layer systems.  
Furthermore, Table 2 shows that national collective bargaining systems which are 
characterized by a predominant level of collective bargaining eroded dramatically since 
 the advent of the economic crisis. By using the criterion that a level is predominant for a 
country if two thirds of all collective agreements are struck exclusively on one layer, we 
see that in 2013 only a few numbers of countries are characterized by a predominant level 
of collective bargaining. While in 2009 21 countries had a predominant level of 
bargaining (11 with company and 10 with higher level bargaining), in 2013 only 11 
countries remained (with 8 at company and 3 at higher level).  
In fact the reforms and changes in collective bargaining led to the emergence 
and/or increased formation of different subsystems, i.e. collective bargaining units, with 
different actors which are often independent from each other as reforms did not consider 
any forms of integrative interaction, i.e. coordination between actors at different layers in 
the national system (Voss et al., 2015). This multi-layered structure with different actors 
potentially implies functional parallelism and potential divergence in interests. A prime 
example is that non-trade union representatives are able to strike collective agreements 
for their domain in addition (in parallel) to other actors both at company and higher level 
(see Table 1 for countries in which these reforms were introduced). Thus actors might 
also pursue different pathways of institutional transformation leading to a further increase 
in the complexity and fragmentation of national collective bargaining systems i.e. in 
fostering the process of hybridization.  
As outlined before, the transformation of systems in which actors at different 
layers coexist, potentially leads to functional parallelism. This implies that institutional 
 components, i.e. subsystems, co-exist and potentially are even competing with each other 
if the different subsystems are not coordinated, i.e. if there is no integrative interaction 
between actors of different subsystems. By looking at the exogenously initiated reforms 
since the advent of the economic crisis it is striking that the sole target and object of 
change was the level of bargaining. The CSR of the EU and in particular the blueprints 
of the Troika organisations focused exclusively on fostering company collective 
bargaining or no collective bargaining. No attention has been given to the coordination, 
i.e. integrative interaction, between different bargaining units. Thus the exogenously 
induced transformations were characterized by a “disorganized” rather than an “organized 
decentralization” in the sense of Traxler (1995) and therefore no mechanisms are in place 
to permit  different bargaining units to follow coordinated or common pathways.  
 
The dynamic instability of national systems 
 
What has also changed since the advent of the economic crisis is that not only the 
magnitude of transformation of systems intensified, but also the frequency. When looking 
at the number of transformation across all the EU member states before and since the 
global economic crisis arrived in Europe, it is striking that the number of transformations 
increased significantly after 2008  (e.g. Brandl and Ibsen, 2017; European Commission, 
2015b).  
 These transformations covered all key dimensions of national collective 
bargaining systems. In more than 20 countries regulations on opening clauses were 
changed since 2008 (i.e. from 2008 until 2015) and in some countries repeatedly, while 
prior to the advent of the crisis in 2008 there were almost no changes (i.e. only in 3 
countries) in the same number of years (i.e. from 2000 to 2007) (European Commission, 
2015b).  Some opening clauses were designed to allow temporary opt out or opt in 
regulations in the sense that companies were either covered by no agreement, a sector 
agreement, or a company agreement in different periods. This possibility implies that the 
relevance of collective agreements per se and the relevance of different layers at which 
bargaining takes place within a country potentially fluctuate over time. This makes the 
structure of national collective bargaining systems dynamically unstable over time. In 
fact, it potentially implies that the predominant layer at which collective bargaining takes 
place, which is usually considered as one key characteristic of distinct national collective 
bargaining systems, fluctuates over time.   
However, so far relatively few changes with respect to the predominant structure 
of collective bargaining are reported in previous literature (e.g. Visser, 2016). However, 
the instability has increased since 2008. In the period between 2000 and 2007 changes in 
the predominant collective bargaining structure were observable in only a few countries 
(e.g. in Finland, the Netherlands, and Romania) while from 2008 to 2015 changes in a 
significantly higher number of countries were observable (e.g. in Finland, France, Greece, 
 Ireland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain) (Aumayr-Pintar et al., 2014). In sum, 
the period before the crisis was characterized by a higher stability of collective bargaining 
systems and in the environment in which bargaining takes place.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In 2008 Europe was hit by the most dramatic economic crisis since the 1930s, which not 
only changed the economic environment for companies and employees dramatically, but 
also induced some fundamental transformations in the institutional environment in which 
companies and employees are embedded. In this article the transformation of national 
collective bargaining systems in the member states of the EU since the advent of the 
economic crisis was investigated. Against the background that collective bargaining 
systems have always transformed, in this article it is argued that the recent economic crisis 
not only triggered an increase in the number of transformations but also changed the 
nature of national collective bargaining systems themselves in many countries. We traced 
back the sources of change to two main driving forces or dynamics. The first impetus 
stems from the endogenous logic of path dependency in the transformation of national 
employment relations systems and the second from exogenous pressure to reform national 
systems in accordance with the strategies and  logics of supranational organisations such 
as the EC, ECB, IMF, and in particular from the European Union’s new economic 
 governance strategy. It was argued that endogenous and exogenous dynamics of 
transformation are potentially diverging and thus the aggregate transformation of 
collective bargaining systems is characterized by a whipsaw action from the two different 
driving forces of change leading to the evolution of hybrid national collective bargaining 
systems. 
More specifically, in this article it was argued that exogenously driven 
transformations of national collective bargaining systems since the advent of the global 
economic crisis never fully replaced older institutional structures or completely 
superseded old social partners’ endogenous logics of action. Instead the exogenously 
imposed transformations in collective bargaining structures led to an increase in the 
number of actors at different layers of the national system, i.e. to an increase in different 
subsystems within national collective bargaining systems which do not necessarily have 
the same interests and/or follow the same logics and pathways of institutional 
transformation. While some subsystems are constrained by endogenously driven path 
dependency, others follow new exogenously induced pathways of transformation. This 
argument led us to develop the basic hypothesis that all these transformations of collective 
bargaining systems are causing national systems to become increasingly multi-layered, 
perforated, and dynamically unstable, i.e. hybrid.      
By summing up the above characterization and transformation of national 
collective bargaining systems in the EU it becomes evident that apart from e various 
 differences regarding the specific quality and quantity of changes in different dimensions, 
the common denominator, by examining the aggregate effects upon national collective 
bargaining systems, is that since the advent of the global economic crisis different 
subsystems followed different pathways with different logics of transformation. This 
common denominator fully supports our hypothesis that subsystems are potentially 
diverging which makes the aggregate, i.e. the national system of collective bargaining, 
increasingly hybrid. 
Against the background that the evolution of hybrid collective bargaining systems 
is certainly an unwanted effect (or by-product) of (potentially) well-intended reforms and 
changes of national collective bargaining systems, conclusions on the “success” of past 
policy reforms can be drawn. The Troika used a blueprint for reform which is based on 
the assumption that decentralized collective bargaining systems enable efficient labour 
market adjustment. However, in this article we have argued and shown that exogenously 
imposed reforms according to this blueprint rarely ever (fully) materialized. Instead these 
reforms have led to the evolution of a different type of collective bargaining system, i.e. 
of hybrid systems with a different efficacy and with different effects on the adjustment of 
the labour market!  
Thus the effectiveness and meaningfulness of exogenously induced reforms to 
some national collective bargaining systems since the advent of the economic crisis is 
challenged by the results of this paper. Therefore, an assessment of these newly evolved 
 hybrid collective bargaining systems is urgently required for two reasons. First, as the 
transformation of national collective bargaining systems has not yet finished and thus the 
meaningfulness of this process is questionable. Secondly, as the economic crisis is still 
not surmounted a better understanding of the effects of institutional reforms is required 
in order to help policymakers to affect the labour market as they intend. 
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 Appendix 
 
Table 1. Examples of transformation of key dimensions of national collective bargaining 
since the start of the crisis and the change in the incidence of collective agreements at 
different levels 
Form of Transformation Countries 
Introduction/increase in opening clauses Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden 
 
Change in extension mechanisms Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Spain 
 
Involvement of non-union representatives in 
collective bargaining 
Greece, Hungary, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain 
 
Abolition of the favourability principle Greece, Ireland, Spain 
 
Change in incidence of collective agreements: 
The number of collective agreements changed (higher 
level agreements decreased/lower level agreements 
increased) 
 
Belgium, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden 
 
Source: Eurofound (2014a, 2014b, 2016), Van Gyes and Schulten (2015). 
 
 Table 2. Overview of the incidence (in percentages) of different structures of collective 
bargaining in the EU member states and change since the start of the crisis 
  2009   2013   Change 
Country 
Compan
y 
Mult
i 
Highe
r 
  
Compan
y 
Mult
i 
Highe
r 
  
Compan
y 
Mult
i 
Highe
r 
 Austria 19 12 69  4 25 71  -15 13 2 
 Belgium 25 6 69  7 49 43  -18 43 -26 
 Bulgaria 65 5 30  61 25 13  -4 20 -17 
 Croatia 38 11 51  65 24 11  27 13 -40 
 Cyprus 70 3 27  46 35 19  -24 32 -8 
 Czech Republic 88 4 8  82 14 4  -6 10 -4 
 Denmark 20 15 65  23 51 26  3 36 -39 
 Estonia 79 3 18  59 22 19  -20 19 1 
 Finland 12 4 84  6 28 67  -6 24 -17 
 France 43 5 52  31 45 24  -12 40 -28 
 Germany 30 2 68  31 29 41  1 27 -27 
 Greece 40 6 54  17 44 39  -23 38 -15 
 Hungary 70 5 25  61 25 14  -9 20 -11 
 Ireland 32 1 67  29 34 37  -3 33 -30 
 Italy 17 22 61  4 23 72  -13 1 11 
 Latvia 76 5 19  73 8 19  -3 3 0 
 Lithuania 95 3 2  69 19 12  -26 16 10 
 Luxembourg 22 11 67  35 41 24  13 30 -43 
 Malta 68 4 28  48 40 12  -20 36 -16 
 Netherlands 27 2 71  36 31 34  9 29 -37 
 Poland 76 2 22  87 8 5  11 6 -17 
 Portugal 20 4 76  10 31 58  -10 27 -18 
 Romania 85 3 12  84 11 6  -1 8 -6 
 Slovakia 71 5 22  75 18 7  4 13 -15 
 Slovenia 40 6 54  46 31 24  6 25 -30 
 Spain 29 3 68  17 30 53  -12 27 -15 
 Sweden 25 15 60  3 63 35  -22 48 -25 
 United 
Kingdom 
53 4 43   63 24 13   10 20 -30 
Note: “Company” refers to the share (percentage) of companies in a country in which employees are 
covered by a collective agreement which was struck exclusively on a company/establishment level in 
relation to all other collective agreements. “Higher” if the collective agreement was struck exclusively at a 
sectoral or national level, and “Multi” if employees in companies are covered by more than one collective 
agreement (struck at different layers/levels). Data for 2009 from Eurofound (2010) and from Eurofound 
(2015) for 2013. Please note that the shares are referring to relative share of companies with collective 
agreements. For reasons of comparability and availability of data companies with no collective agreement 
are not considered in the sample. Even though there is an increase in the number of companies with no 
collective agreement in the majority of the EU members states (e.g. European Commission, 2015b) the 
changes in (multi-)layer structure are significantly higher. “Change” shows the change in percentage for 
the three structures of collective bargaining from 2009 to 2013.   
 
